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REDISTRICTING PRINCIPLES FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Micah Altman†
Michael P. McDonald††
ABSTRACT
Baker v. Carr’s elevation of new population equality criteria for
redistricting over old geographic-based criteria reflected an
evolution in how the courts and society understood the principles
of representation. Twenty-first century principles of redistricting
should reflect modern understandings of representation and good
government—and also reflect the new opportunities and
constraints made possible through advancing technology and data
collection.
INTRODUCTION
The landmark 1962 United States Supreme Court decision Baker
v. Carr1 profoundly affected redistricting practices. Prior to the
decision, the federal government imposed limited regulations on
congressional districting that were weakly enforced. Congressional
and state legislative redistricting rules and procedures were to be
found primarily in state constitutions and statutes that were similarly
rarely enforced. By declaring redistricting to be justiciable, the Court
laid down a marker in Baker that federal constitutional and statutory
criteria would be enforced upon the states. A flurry of redistricting
activity commenced following subsequent decisions in Wesberry v.
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1 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Sanders2 and in Reynolds v. Sims3 finding that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires districts to be of equal population. The federal
courts overturned many state redistricting provisions in whole,
particularly when sections that favored minimum allocation of seats
to local government administrative units would result in
impermissibly large population deviations among districts.
At the time, observers cheered these decisions, believing that
disarming the gerrymandering demon’s tool of malapportionment—
unequal district populations—would significantly constrain
redistricting mischief. However, politicians reacted to the
subordinance of traditional redistricting principles to population
equality by using population equality as justification to draw noncompact districts that split existing political boundaries. The intent
behind these oddly shaped districts was often to favor or disfavor a
political party, minority community, or incumbent by finely slicing
communities, and even isolate prospective candidates’ homes, using
district lines. The gerrymander evolved and continued to thrive in its
new legal environment.
In the decades following Baker, reformers have struggled to forge
new links to chain the dreaded gerrymander—and have had some
notable successes such as the federal Voting Rights Act and the
adoption of citizen redistricting commissions by ballot initiative in
states such as Arizona and California. This Article’s purpose is to
categorize these efforts to regulate redistricting and to identify new
opportunities made possible by emerging technological innovations.
By doing so, we hope to illuminate potentially viable heretofore
unexplored reform pathways enabled by technological innovations.
I. REDISTRICTING PRINCIPLES PRIOR TO BAKER V. CARR
Early U.S. districting was based on principles of representation
found primarily in state constitutions that recognized both individual
interests and territorially organized (although not necessarily
contiguous) communities. The primary operational constraints were
the regularity of redistricting to equalize populations, and the integrity
of administrative units, most often counties. Contiguity was a
common, but secondary constraint. Often, districting was
synonymous with the practice of applying a population formula to
allocate a number of legislative seats to administrative units such as
counties or towns, a process known as apportionment.

2
3

376 U.S. 1 (1964).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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The U.S. Constitution is silent on the use of districts as a means to
select members to Congress, much less on the use and manner of
redistricting. Article I, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution describes a
method of apportionment of congressional seats to the states
following the decennial census.4 And, until the 28th Congress, 20 to
44 percent of representatives were not elected from single-member
districts.5
Using the authority granted under Article I, section 4, Congress
mandated the use of single member districts in 1842.6
Notwithstanding the prohibition on multi-member congressional
districts, representatives continued to be elected from multimember/at-large districts in every subsequent decade before Baker.
And, prior to the equal population standard articulated in the litigation
subsequent to Baker, states would only be required to change their
congressional districts in the event that apportionment resulted in a
loss of a seat to Congress. Even then, political circumstances
sometimes prevented a state from implementing a new districting

4 Article I, section 2 states that “[t]he Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for
every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative.” U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 2. This was later amended in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that
“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.” Id.
at amend. XIV, § 2. The number of seats gradually increased over time as the county’s
population grew. In 1911, the number of representatives was set at 433, plus two more seats
allocated for Arizona and New Mexico when they achieved statehood. Act of Aug. 3, 1911, ch.
5, 37 Stat. 13, 14. Congress failed to enact an apportionment for the 1920 census, and in 1929, a
compromise was reached that permanently fixed the number at 435. Reapportionment Act of
June 18, 1929, ch. 28, 46 Stat. 21, 26, 27. Temporary increases were permitted in 1960 for
Alaska and Hawaii statehood. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85–508, § 9, 72 Stat. 339, 345
(1958); Hawaii Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 86–3, § 8, 73 Stat. 4, 8 (1959).
5 Micah Altman, Traditional Districting Principles: Judicial Myths vs. Reality, 22 SOC.
SCI. HIST. 159, 171 tbl.5 (1998).
6 Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491; see Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8
n.11 (1964) (“As late as 1842, seven States still conducted congressional elections at large.”).
The requirement was omitted in 1850, Act of May 23, 1850, ch. 11, § 25, 9 Stat. 428, 432–33,
but reinstated in 1862, Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 170, 12 Stat. 572. The requirement was omitted
in the Reapportionment Act of June 18, 1929, ch. 28, § 22, 46 Stat. 21, 26–27; see also, Wood
v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1932) (discussing the legislative history of the 1929 Act and
determining that the omission was deliberate). Congress reinstated the requirement in 1967, Act
of Dec. 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90–196, 81 Stat. 581 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2006)); see
generally Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 555–56 (1946) (discussing the history of
congressional redistricting legislation). Although it is contemplated in 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) that atlarge elections may be used to elect members of Congress if a state fails to conduct a
redistricting, 2 U.S.C. § 2c requires that “only” single-member districts shall be used, which was
given precedence over 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) in Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003), except when
“on the eve of a congressional election, no constitutional redistricting plan exists and there is no
time for either the State’s legislature or the courts to develop one.” Id. at 275 (opinion of Scalia,
J.).
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plan, and attempts to enforce the law in the courts generally met with
failure.7
Through statute, the federal government prior to Baker also
imposed some criteria on how the districts were to be drawn. The
1872 Act required that congressional districts have “practicable”
population equality, and the 1901 Act added a general compactness
requirement.8 However, the 1929 apportionment compromise did not
reinstate any of the past Acts’ requirements for contiguity, equalpopulation, compactness, or single-member districts.9
In the federal system, states are tasked with drawing districts. State
constitutions often describe a mechanism for apportionment or
redistricting their state legislatures, since that function is a part of
organizing state government. However, with two exceptions—
California’s county integrity requirement and West Virginia’s
requirement for contiguity and compactness10—prior to Baker they
were silent on congressional redistricting, perhaps because the federal
government had primary oversight of congressional elections through
Article I, section 4 of the U.S. Constitution.11
All states use a district-based system to elect state legislatures.
Today, all states award a seat to the candidate that receives a plurality
of the vote in an election.12 While most states use single-member
districts, some elect multiple candidates from the same district, and
some states have implemented what are known as floterial districts,
where districts for the same legislative body may overlap.13 In states
7 See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. at 552 (refusing to intervene in a redistricting
controversy in Illinois “because due regard for the effective working of our Government
revealed this issue to be of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial
determination”).
8 See Altman, supra note 5, at 167 (summarizing chapter nine of LAURENCE F.
SCHMECKEBIER, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT 127–92 (1941)).
9 It was unclear whether these requirements were in effect until the Court ruled that the
Acts applied only to the apportionment for which they were written. See Wood v. Broom, 287
U.S. at 6 (interpreting the provisions of each reapportionment act to apply “to the election of
representatives ‘under this apportionment,’ that is, the apportionment made by the particular
act”).
10 Altman, supra note 5, at 168 tbl. 3.
11 For a review of the current laws see Michael P. McDonald, A Comparative Analysis of
U.S. State Redistricting Institutions, 4 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 371 (2004); JUSTIN LEVITT,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING (2010), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/a_citizens_guide_to_redistricting_2010_edition.
12 See James L. McDowell, Illinois, in REAPPORTIONMENT POLITICS, THE HISTORY OF
REDISTRICTING IN THE 50 STATES 101, 108 (Leroy Hardy et al. eds., 1981) (describing how
Illinois was the last state to employ a form of proportional representation for the state House, a
system that was replaced with plurality-win elections in 1980).
13 New Hampshire is the only state that currently uses floterial districts for state
legislatures. See Boyer v. Gardner, 540 F. Supp. 624, 626 (D.N.H. 1982) (upholding the state’s
use of floterial districts). Floterial districts were used for congressional elections when a state
would gain a district through apportionment, fail to redistrict, and elect the addition seats
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that use multi-member districts, voters are typically given a number
of votes equal to the number of seats and may vote for one or more
candidates. Candidates are rank-ordered by the votes they receive and
the top candidates for a given number of seats to be elected are
declared winners. All states must redistrict their legislative districts,
with the exception that no redistricting is required if a state is
allocated a single congressional district.
The state constitutional and statutory mechanisms by which
redistricting for both congressional and state legislative redistricting
occurs are varied as to the process, timing of redistricting, and criteria
to be applied.14 And unlike the federal courts, prior to Baker v. Carr,
state courts occasionally weighed-in on state constitutional issues. For
example, state courts adjudicated alleged state constitutional
violations in California, Illinois, Michigan, New York, North
Carolina, and Wisconsin.15 But, even for states with state
constitutional provisions guiding state legislative redistricting,
deference by the state courts to the political process was historically
the norm.
Altman lists the formal criteria for legislative redistricting in each
state and the time of their adoption.16 To summarize, states were split
on the primary method of apportionment—while some states based
apportionment of state legislatures’ seats on population, others
explicitly apportioned by counties, cities or other pre-existing
geographical and political units. Even in states where apportionment
was based on population, many states required that districts respect
county lines. A substantial minority of states also required contiguity,
and only seven required compactness.
An empirical analysis of historical congressional districts reveals a
somewhat different picture:17 Even in the absence of formal
requirements, the vast majority of congressional districts followed
county (or, more rarely, town and city) boundaries, at least up to the
time of the 48th Congress in 1883.18 With the exception of districts

through overlapping at-large districts. 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2006).
14 For a survey of timing derived from state constitutions, state statutes, and state court
opinions, see Justin Levitt & Michael P. McDonald, Taking the “Re” out of Redistricting: State
Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95 GEO. L.J. 1247, 1254–66 (2007).
15 Levitt & McDonald, supra note 14, at 1255.
16 Altman, supra note 5, at 169–70.
17 See id. at 180–85 (finding that historically “very few districts divided town and county
boundaries”); see also KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF UNITED STATES
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, 1789–1983 (1982) (showing historical rural congressional districts
tended to be composed of whole counties).
18 Altman, supra note 5, at 181 tbl. 7.
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spanning large bodies of water, violations of contiguity were quite
rare during this time.19 Historical congressional districts were also
compact (by common quantitative measures) compared to modern,
post-Baker districts.20
Congressional districts were also routinely malapportioned, even
after the passage of the 1842 Reapportionment Act. In the most
malapportioned states, population varied by a ratio of 9.5 to 1 prior to
the Act (during the 18th Congress), although the average degree of
malapportionment was substantially lower.21
In large part, both the relative compactness of the districts and
their relative malapportionment were a result of the formal and
informal emphasis on counties as a unit of representation. Counties
were often themselves relatively compact, but varied greatly in
population. The widespread practice of forming districts from
contiguous counties limited the potential for districts to be noncompact, while constraining the possibility for population equality.
The stability of district boundaries also contributed to
malapportionment. In practice, a state was forced to change its district
lines only when a state’s seat allocation changed. And, even in this
case, the required changes were more limited than after Baker: the
addition of a seat might be addressed by adding an at-large district,
while the subtraction of a seat could be addressed only by modifying
a few districts.
II. THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION
Baker was not the first acknowledgement by the Court that the
right to vote went beyond the simple right to cast a ballot and to have
that ballot counted. Two years earlier, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,22 the
Court recognized the principle that voters could be harmed by
reducing the effectiveness of their vote. In Gomillion, Black
petitioners asserted that the city of Tuskegee had gerrymandered its
boundaries to remove all black resident voters, thereby eliminating
any meaningful black participation in city elections. The Court
agreed.
Justice Frankfurter, delivering the opinion of the Court, framed the
issue as a deprivation of the right of blacks to vote, as guaranteed by
the Fifteenth Amendment.23 But the facts of the case were that no
19
20
21
22
23

Id. at 180–81.
Id. at 181–85.
Id. at 177 fig. 5.
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
Id. at 340–48.
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petitioner was individually denied the right to vote, nor were such
votes literally discarded. Instead the voting power of blacks was
effectively reduced by removing them from an important political
unit. Gomillion’s operating principle seems to have been not an
abstract racial classification but the denial of the effective right to
vote.
Following Baker, the Supreme Court’s two landmark 1964
decisions Reynolds v. Sims24 and Wesberry v. Sanders25 imposed
federal operational constraints of equal population and emphasized
principles of equal protection. At the time, observers cheered these
decisions. They believed that disarming the gerrymandering demon’s
tool of malapportionment—unequal district populations—would
significantly constrain redistricting mischief.26 To be sure,
malapportionment had been a powerful tool to favor rural political
interests by diminishing the effective voting power of urban dwellers
living in fast growing cities.27 As Gelman and King note, however,
“population equality guarantees almost no form of fairness beyond
numerical equality of population.”28 Indeed, politicians reacted to the
subordinance of traditional redistricting principles to population
equality by using population equality as justification to draw noncompact districts that split existing political boundaries.29 A
motivation underlying these oddly shaped districts was often to favor
or disfavor a political party, minority community, or incumbent by
finely slicing communities, and even prospective candidates’ homes,
with district lines. The partisan gerrymander evolved and continued to
thrive in its new legal environment.
A flurry of litigation in the wake of these 1964 decisions struck
down many state constitutional practices, particularly apportionment
procedures that allocated seats to counties or towns. Simple allocation
rules guaranteeing a minimum number of seats to governmental units
337 U.S. 533 (1964).
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
26 See John P. White & Norman C. Thomas, Urban and Rural Representation and State
Legislative Apportionment, 17 W. POL. Q. 724, 741 (1964) (“Feelings of apathy and
hopelessness about [malapportionment] have given way to a rather manic euphoria since the
Baker and Reynolds decisions.”).
27 See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere, Alan Gerber & James Snyder, Equal Votes, Equal
Money: Court-Ordered Redistricting and Public Expenditures in the American States, 96 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 767, 768 (2002) (finding the reapportionment revolution shifted allocation of
federal money from rural areas to urban areas).
28 Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy through Legislative
Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 553 (1994).
29 See Richard G. Niemi & Laura R. Winsky, The Persistence of Partisan Redistricting
Effects in Congressional Elections in the 1970s and 1980s, 54 J. POL. 565, 566 (1992) (“[T]here
has been speculation that partisan gerrymandering only began to flower in the 1980s, as
legislators learned how to take maximum advantage of the equal population requirement .”).
24
25
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would result in impermissibly large population deviations among
districts according to the Court’s new interpretation of the federal
constitution. States revised their constitutions, often through state
constitutional conventions.
Empirically, a clear result of Baker was to reduce
malapportionment at the cost of the main traditional redistricting
criterion pre-Baker, county integrity. After the equal population
criterion was introduced, the number of districts following county
boundaries dropped dramatically, as did average geographic
compactness of districts. Simultaneously, the number of districts that
were not contiguous or that maintained contiguity through
questionable measures, such as connection at a single point, increased
dramatically. Similar changes occurred after Karcher v. Daggett,30
which imposed near-absolute population equality requirements.31
In some cases, states created redistricting commissions, either as a
sole redistricting authority or as a backup to the regular legislative
process.32 Some commentators believe that all redistricting
commissions are “independent” from politics,33 and some redistricting
commissions in other countries are relatively independent.34 A more
pragmatic examination of redistricting commissions in the United
States, however, and particularly these early ones, reveals that these
commissions were more often designed to concentrate political power
in party leaders, rather than to remove politics from the process.
Among the most telling examples are those in which elected officials
serve as commissioners.35 After Baker, the federal courts served as a
462 U.S. 725 (1983).
See Altman, supra note 5, at 180–86 (attributing a decrease in compactness of districts
after Karcher v. Daggett to the necessity of meeting the strict requirements, “which is not to say
that some gerrymanderers did not make a virtue of necessity”).
32 See Levitt & McDonald, supra note 14, at 1255 n.36 (listing states that revisited district
population requirements); McDonald, supra note 11, at 381 tbl.2 (listing states that amended
their redistricting processes in the 1960s through the early 1970s: Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri (state House only), Montana, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania). Some states enacted reforms preceding the 1960s. Ohio
instituted the first U.S. redistricting commission as sole redistricting authority in 1851 and
Texas pioneered the commission as a backup to a failure of the legislative process in 1948. Id.
These states share a common principle with the states that later amended their constitutions:
Ohio and Texas sought to ensure that districts were regularly drawn in a timely manner in order
to manage their states’ population growth. Kathleen L. Barber, Ohio, in REAPPORTIONMENT
POLITICS, supra note 12, at 256–57; Ronald G. Claunch, Wesley S. Chumlea & James G.
Dickson, Jr., Texas, in REAPPORTIONMENT POLITICS, supra note 12, at 311.
33 Alan Abramowitz, Brad Alexander, & Matthew Gunning, Don’t Blame Redistricting
for Uncompetitive Elections, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 87, 87–89 (2006).
34 See Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, Technology for Public Participation in
Redistricting, in REDISTRICTING AND REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE WEST 247–71 (Gary F.
Moncrief ed. 2011) (discussing a project to enable the public instead of politicians to draw
redistricting plans).
35 See McDonald, supra note 11, at 380–84 (describing the functioning of redistricting
30
31
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reversionary point if a state failed to redistrict, whereas, prior to
Baker, the previous plan would have remained in force unless a state
experienced a change in the number of congressional districts through
apportionment.36 Thus, a goal of these commissions was to ensure
that redistricting plans were implemented without engaging the
courts, which might adopt plans (or create their own) in opposition to
political leaders’ interests.
A second wave of redistricting reform began in the 1980s, more
typically through the initiative process.37 A hallmark of these recent
reforms is that they are championed by good government groups and
are intended to reduce the influence of politics in the redistricting
process.38 These commissions are modeled on bureaucratic
redistricting institutions used in other countries in that ostensibly
politically independent commissioners are tasked to draw lines
following a set of traditional redistricting criteria.39
Some posit that traditional redistricting principles can act as a
hedge against gerrymandering.40 One should be cautious, however,
about putting one’s faith in traditional redistricting principles to
produce politically neutral outcomes. Chief Justice Brennan
pessimistically noted that following traditional criteria, such as
drawing pleasing shapes, is a not a gerrymandering cure, stating that,
“this politically mindless approach may produce, whether intended or
not, the most grossly gerrymandered results . . . .”41 And, as the next

commissions in various states).
36 See GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER: THE
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 61 (2002) (finding that
the equal population mandate erased a 6 percentage point Republican bias outside the South and
increased the incumbency advantage).
37 States that more recently reformed their redistricting processes through citizen-led
ballot initiatives include Arizona, California, Florida, and Washington. Alaska and Idaho’s
legislatures amended their constitutions through legislative-proposed referendum during this
period, but these reforms were designed primarily to reduce the influence of the governor in
redistricting. See discussion infra Part III.
38 For an alternative view on redistricting reform, see Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan
Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1985) (arguing that legislatures can be held accountable through elections
while independent commissions are unelected and cannot be punished, that legislators know the
communities in their districts the best, and that legislators are the best suited to deliberate the
thorny trade-offs that are inherent in redistricting).
39 For a survey of these commissions, see Lisa Handley, A Comparative Survey of
Structures and Criteria for Boundary Delimitation, in REDISTRICTING IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 265 (Lisa Handley & Bernie Grofman eds., 2008).
40 See JONATHAN WINBURN, THE REALITIES OF REDISTRICTING: FOLLOWING THE RULES
AND LIMITING GERRYMANDERING IN STATE LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING 9 (2008)
(“Specifically, the principle against splitting political subdivisions plays a key function in
constraining the remappers from gerrymandering.”).
41 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973); see also, FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK

129

1188

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:4

section describes, facially neutral criteria such as geographic
compactness are likely to systematically favor one party.
Indeed, more recent reforms also adopt “shall not favor” language
indicating that a redistricting plan should not overtly benefit a party or
candidate or go even further to require political outcomes, such as
competitive districts.42 As federal courts have established (mostly)
consistent federal standards for redistricting, the political legal battles
over redistricting have shifted to the state courts and allegations of
violations of state criteria,43 raising in importance an understanding of
how these criteria are implemented.
III. A TYPOLOGY OF REDISTRICTING REGULATIONS
The history of redistricting inscribes a circular route from an
emphasis on traditional redistricting principles; to, in the wake of
Baker, an emphasis on population equality and minority voting rights
at the expense of traditional redistricting principles; and returning to
focus on traditional principles, with recent efforts by reformers to reelevate respect for traditional redistricting principles. Coupled with
the renewed emphasis on traditional redistricting principles is a
recognition that they do not, alone, suffice to curtail gerrymandering,
that political outcomes should be explicitly incorporated into
redistricting criteria, and that these criteria must be considered by an
independent redistricting body.44
Adam Cox devises a useful typology to describe three elements of
redistricting regulation: process-based regulations, which are
designed to constrain how the lines are drawn; outcome-based
regulations, which are designed to prospectively produce a political
outcome; and institution-selecting regulations, which are designed to
alter who draws the lines.45

VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965 153–56 (1990)
(describing how an ostensibly neutral criterion was used to disguise a racial gerrymander in
Hinds County, Mississippi); MICHAEL P. MCDONALD, THE MIDWEST MAPPING PROJECT
(2009), available at http://elections.gmu.edu/Midwest_Mapping_Project.pdf (describing how
traditional redistricting principles tend to result in pro-Democratic biases in five Midwestern
states).
42 Bruce E. Cain, Karin Mac Donald, & Michael McDonald, From Equality to Fairness:
The Path of Political Reform Since Baker v. Carr, in PARTY LINES: COMPETITION,
PARTISANSHIP AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 6, 26–27 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E.
Cain eds., 2005).
43 Id. at 17.
44 Id. at 6–28.
45 See Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751,
756 (2004) (describing those three elements of redistricting regulation); see also Michael P.
McDonald, Regulating Redistricting, 40 PS: POL. SCI. AND POL. 675, 675 (2007) (same).
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Process-based regulations describe formalistic criteria that are
applied to the drawing of districts; many of these are commonly
known as ‘traditional’ redistricting principles. While we discuss
specific examples, for the sake of space, we refer interested readers to
complete lists of state criteria compiled by others.46 These criteria
include population equality, contiguity, compactness, respect for
existing political boundaries, respect for communities of interest,
preservation of district cores, and nesting of districts.47 Process-based
regulations constrain the choices available to a redistricting authority
and are claimed to foster better constituent-representative linkages by
aligning community and district boundaries.48
During the 1960s, federal courts applied a population equality
standard for congressional districts in Wesberry v. Sanders and for
state legislative districts in Reynolds v. Sims. For congressional
redistricting, the federal courts (following Karcher v. Daggett) have
generally adopted a de minimis standard requiring exact population
equality, although they will allow deviations to achieve a compelling
state interest.49 The federal courts have allowed up to a 10 percentagepoint range for state legislative districts.50 The federally allowable
range is a floor, and some states have enacted more restrictive
population deviations for their state legislative districts.
Contiguity simply means that all parts of a district must connect.
While generally non-controversial, example districts of questionable
contiguity stretch across water, intersect another district over water or
at a single point, are comprised of continuous land but are not
navigable using existing transportation routes, or are connected only
See Levitt, supra note 11, at 29–36.
Id.
48 See Richard N. Engstrom, District Geography and Voters, in REDISTRICTING IN THE
NEW MILLENNIUM 65, 74–77 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005) (discussing and testing the
hypothesis that alignment of community and district boundaries leads to higher voter turnout);
Richard G. Niemi, Lynda W. Powell, & Patricia L. Bicknell, The Effects of Congruity Between
Community and District on Salience of U.S. House Candidates, 11 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 187, 188–90
(1986) (exploring the relationship between community-district congruity and citizens’
knowledge of congressional candidates, and finding that “the nature of the district is related to
candidate awareness.”).
49 See Karcher v Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 782 (1983) (articulating a de minimis population
standard for congressional districts unless there is a compelling state interest). Arkansas, Iowa,
and West Virginia drew districts out of whole counties in the 2000s. The constitutionality of
these plans, however, was never tested in federal court. See MARTIS, supra note 17 (showing
how prior to Baker v. Carr rural congressional districts were often drawn out of whole
counties).
50 See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (“Our decisions have established, as
a general matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10%
falls within this category of minor deviations.”). But see Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949
(2004) (finding a state cannot systematically under-populate a party’s districts within the ten
percentage point range).
46
47
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at a single point.51 Compactness refers to the shape of a district, but is
formally ill-defined. Scholars have proposed over fifty compactness
measures, which have not resulted in clarity, since these measures
conflict and can be manipulated.52 Iowa is the only state that has
adopted by statute an unambiguously defined quantitatively
measurable compactness measure.53 Otherwise, the federal and state
courts have generally found constitutionally impermissible
compactness violations based on visual inspection of the shape of a
district.54
Redistricting authorities may be required to respect political,
physical, and cultural boundaries. Some states require that district
boundaries respect existing political boundaries, which may include
counties, municipalities, cities, towns, villages, and even local
precincts and wards. States may require districts to follow visible
geographic features, such as rivers, mountains, or islands. States may
require respect for communities of interest, which may include local
government units, but may also include any identifiable geographic
community that shares common social interests, economic interests,
media markets, transportation corridors, or demographic factors.55
These communities may straddle or be contained within local
government units.56 Even other legislative district boundaries may be
respected, a practice known as nesting, which is particularly relevant
when two or more lower chamber districts are wholly contained
within a Senate district.57
Outcome-based regulations seek to achieve political goals. Among
the most well-known political goals is the goal of minority
representation that is enshrined in the federal Voting Rights Act and
similar language found in some state constitutions. Volumes have
been written and litigated concerning the Voting Rights Act, so we

51 See Altman, supra note 5, at 164 (“[B]reaches of contiguity may be difficult or
impossible to avoid because of geographic obstacles, such as large bodies of water . . . .”).
52 See Richard G. Niemi, Bernard Grofman, Carl Carlucci & Thomas Hoffeller,
Measuring Compactness and the Role of a Compactness Standard in a Test for Partisan and
Racial Gerrymandering, 52 J. POL. 1155, 1156 (1990) (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of several compactness measures); Altman supra note 5, at 165–66 (same).
53 IOWA CODE, Title II § 42.4.
54 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 655–56 (1993) (finding North Carolina’s 12th
Congressional District adopted in the 1990s was “bizarre” in shape, and thus subordinated
traditional redistricting principles to racial motivations).
55 See Levitt, supra note 11, at 56 for a detailed description of these considerations with
examples.
56 For example, see COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47(3) stating “communities of interest,
including ethnic, cultural, economic, trade area, geographic, and demographic factors, shall be
preserved within a single district wherever possible.”
57 Levitt, supra note 11, at 66.
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will only briefly describe it here.58 Section 2 and section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act may be considered outcome-based regulations.
Section 2 applies nationally and the U.S. Supreme Court has
articulated a three-prong test requiring minority opportunity districts
to be drawn if a district can be drawn in a compact manner, there is
racially polarized voting, and there is a past history of
discrimination.59 Section 5 applies to certain “covered” jurisdictions
primarily in the South and requires that the Department of Justice or
the District Court of D.C. determine if an adopted redistricting plan
reduces minority representation from the previous plan.60 If it does,
the plan cannot take effect.
The U.S. Supreme Court has found that partisan gerrymandering is
justiciable;61 however, the Court has never overturned a redistricting
plan because it was an impermissible partisan gerrymander. The
Justices are currently divided 4-1-4, with four believing that partisan
gerrymandering is a political question that cannot be adjudicated, four
believing there is a standard that can be applied to detect a partisan
gerrymander, and Justice Kennedy, who believes that partisan
gerrymandering is justiciable, but had not identified a standard to his
liking.62
Where the federal government has declined to take action to
prevent partisan gerrymandering, some states have stepped into the
void. Donald Stokes, an appointed tie-breaking member of New
Jersey’s state legislative redistricting commission, adopted a widely
used political science method to measure the partisan bias of a
redistricting plan and invited the political parties to bid for his vote by
crafting a plan with the least degree of bias.63 Recently, the Florida
58 See generally VOTING R IGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON
DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER (Ana Henderson ed., 2007) (collecting various
studies on the Voting Rights Act); DAVID CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND
REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS 60–92
(1999) (discussing consequences of the VRA for black majority districts); DAVID LUBLIN, THE
PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN
CONGRESS 4–12 (1997) (providing an overview of the VRA and its impact on racial
redistricting); QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,
1965–1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) (providing a thorough
overview of the VRA and its impact in the South).
59 Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973–1973bb–1 (2006)); see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 89–90 (1986) (articulating
the three-prong test); Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S.Ct. 1231, 1246 (2009) (requiring the
demonstration district contain at least 50 percent voting-age population of the minority group).
60 Voting Rights Act § 5, 79 Stat. at 439.
61 See Davis v Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986) (“[W]e find such political
gerrymandering to be justiciable . . . .”).
62 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 418–20 (2006)
(opinion of Kennedy, J.) (examining various standards but not approving of any one).
63 See DONALD E. STOKES, LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING BY THE NEW JERSEY PLAN
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Supreme Court held that some state Senate districts violated a
criterion adopted by a voter initiative in 2010 that states, “No
apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the intent to favor
or disfavor a political party or an incumbent.”64
Related to partisan gerrymandering is a concern that redistricting
authorities—particularly incumbents—seek to diminish electoral
competition by drawing safe districts.65 To address this concern,
Arizona, Washington, and Wisconsin (since repealed) have required
competitive districts to be drawn with a balance of Democrats and
Republicans.66
Institution-selecting regulations have most commonly taken the
form of a redistricting commission that removes authority from
legislatures. More generally, institution-selecting regulations place
constraints on who creates and selects plans, what influences they are
subject to, and under what conditions they may act.
The history of gerrymandering is replete with examples of
legislators using the process to further their ambitions.67 As the
reform saw goes, in redistricting legislators choose voters rather than
voters choose legislators. Redistricting authorities can use political
information to affect electoral outcomes, such as the location of
incumbent and challenger homes and the partisan composition of
neighborhoods, to attempt to influence political outcomes. Some
(1993); see also Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial
Test for Partisan Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L. J. 2, 10 (2007)
(discussing statistical approaches to measure degree of partisan bias); J. Morgan Kousser,
Estimating the Partisan Consequences of Redistricting Plans-Simply, 21 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 521,
521 (1996) (predicting partisan consequences of redistricting plans).
64 FLA. CONST., art. III, § 21(a); see also In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative
Apportionment
1176,
No.
SC12–1
(Fla.
2012),
available
at
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/sc12-1.pdf (interpreting the standards set forth in the
Florida constitutional amendment); HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (the first state to adopt the
language “No district shall be so drawn as to unduly favor a person or faction.”).
65 See Michael P. McDonald, Redistricting and Competitive Districts, in THE
MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY, ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 222, 227,
229 (Michael P. McDonald & John Samples eds., 2006) (discussing incumbent protection
gerrymanders). For a contrary opinion, see THOMAS L. BRUNELL REDISTRICTING AND
REPRESENTATION: WHY COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR AMERICA 75–89 (2008)
(arguing that uncompetitive districts are desired to minimize the number of people who vote for
the losing candidate).
66 For examples of the requirements, see WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.090 (2011) and ARIZ.
CONST. art. IV, part 2, § 1; WIS. STAT. § 4.001(3) (1981) (repealed 1983).
67 Paul J. Webber, Madison’s Opposition to a Second Convention, 20 POLITY 498, 489–
517 (1988) (describing how Patrick Henry attempted to draw his political foe—James Madison
—out of his district); see, e.g., John Mercurio, Between the Lines, ROLL CALL, July 2, 2001
(describing how candidate Marty Castro was drawn out of Rep. Luis Gutierrez’s district in
Illinois). The very name “gerrymander” comes from a Massachusetts state legislative district
proposed by Gov. Elbridge Gerry in 1812, drawn in the shape of a salamander with the intent of
favoring the Federalist Party. COX & KATZ, supra note 36, at 3.
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states, such as Iowa, blind those drawing the lines from this political
information, with the hope that a blind process produces a neutral
result.68 As stated above, Chief Justice Brennan and others might
disagree that a blind person casting a dart is capable of reliably hitting
a bulls-eye without assistance.
As described above, many of the early commissions were not
designed to be politically neutral: elected officials or their lieutenants
served on them with the purpose to concentrate political power in
party leaders. More recent commissions are designed to reduce
political influence in redistricting through regulating the selection and
activities of commissioners. The 1960 Alaska constitution was first to
limit who could be selected to a redistricting commission, requiring
that “none . . . may be public employees or officials.”69 Hawaii and
Missouri forbid their commissioners from running for office in the
districts they draw.70 Arizona and California impose both regulations,
and further require an agency to vet prospective commissioners to
weed out any partisan wolves in sheep’s clothing.71 Similar
constraints may be implemented through norms. The New Jersey
Supreme Court—responsible for selecting the tie-breaking member of
the state’s commissions—has traditionally selected a neutral tiebreaking member and the Iowa advisory commission’s reputation for
neutrality flows from the professionalism exhibited by the legislative
support staff tasked with drawing plans.72
IV. THE PROMISE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
No redistricting plan can satisfy everyone, barring the ‘utopia’
Madison describes in Federalist 10 in which, “every citizen [had] the
same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.”73 In such a
situation, redistricting would have no effect on representation—as all
districts lines would result in the same representational outcome.
Redistricting is thus inherently about balancing competing
representational goals, while conforming to existing geography and
demography. For example, political units may have oddly shaped or
even non-contiguous geography, which can result in non-compact or
even non-contiguous districts.74 A distinctive characteristic of
68
69
70
71

IOWA CODE § 42.4(5) (2011).
ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6.
HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; MO. CONST. art. III, § 7.
ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, Part 2, § 1(3); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8251 (West 2005 &. Supp.

2012).
72
73
74

STOKES, supra note 63.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, (James Madison).
See McDonald, supra note 41, at 155 (describing how Wisconsin’s 61st Senate district
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redistricting, then, is that these goals are balanced, and constraints
satisfied, through the application of expert judgment.
In the twentieth century, process-based, outcome-based, and
institution-selecting regulation failed to tame the gerrymander in the
United States. The twenty-first century has brought a number of
technological innovations and consequent changes in our
understanding of redistricting regulation. We posit that redistricting in
the twenty-first century can use information technology to improve
governance.
While we are optimistic about the ability for technology to reveal
new process measures and re-imagine old ones, we are cautious about
the ability for computers to ‘solve’ the gerrymandering problem. As
early as the 1960s, scholars posited that computers could be
programmed to automatically draw districts that best achieved a set of
criteria in an ostensibly politically neutral manner.75 While we are
enthusiastic proponents of a positive role for technology in
redistricting, we are skeptical about the ability for computers to be
programmed to provide a solution to gerrymandering.76 In addition to
the potential for political bias to be hidden within the criteria chosen
to be implemented, the optimization problem is too difficult for all
but the simplest redistricting problems.77
A. Information Technology & Process-Based Regulation of
Redistricting
While we believe that process-based regulations have diminished
in importance, many reformers, scholars, and courts still highly value
them. In a given context, such as to promote policy congruence
between local government officials and state representatives, they
may be highly relevant.
The opportunities for use of, and our understandings of, pure
process-based regulation of redistricting are changing. On the one

in the 2000s was non-contiguous because it followed a Racine ward that itself was noncontiguous. The state addressed this situation by simply defining wards as contiguous in WIS.
STAT. 5.15(1)(b)); see also Hall v. Moreno, 270 P.3d 961, 980 (Colo. 2012) (adopting a
redistricting plan proposed by the Democratic Party partially on the grounds that it contained a
greater number of competitive districts.)
75 See William Vickrey, On The Prevention of Gerrymandering, 76 POL. SCI. Q. 105, 106
(1961) (imagining a “completely mechanical” process in which “the human element [is]
removed as completely as possible from the redistricting process”).
76 Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, The Promise and Perils of Computers in
Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 69 (2010).
77 Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, BARD: Better Automated Redistricting, 42 J.
STATISTICAL SOFTWARE 1, 28 (2011), available at http://www.jstatsoft.org/v42/i04.
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hand, the formal importance of geographic criteria, such as
compactness and conformance to political boundaries has diminished.
As we discussed above, the emphasis on equal-population ushered in
by Baker, in effect, forced other criteria to play, at best, a secondary
role.
As important, formal geographical criteria have been justified, in
large part, because they are claimed to act as a proxy for
transportation costs, communication costs, and campaign costs.
Advances in communication technology have greatly weakened the
connection between geographic distance and communication costs.
And these advances, along with the widespread availability of
detailed “micro-targeting” databases of information on voters—have
enabled campaigns to much more effectively and economically target
persuadable voters within districts rather than relying on district-wide
campaign communication.78
Another reason that traditional process measures have been used in
practice, is that they were relatively easy to compute. As we describe
in the next section, technological advances have made the
computation of most imaginable outcome measures straightforward.
This, too, diminishes the need for traditional process measure that are
designed to serve as a proxy for outcome measures, such as limiting
gerrymandering. Furthermore, computation-intensive analysis of
process measures, enabled by computing advances, has identified
potential biases—such as the tendency of compactness criteria to
advantage the Republican party, because its support tends to be more
evenly distributed geographically.79
We hypothesize that information technology can enable new forms
of geographical process measures that are based on crowd-sourced
data. These measures are still in their infancy, but two emerging
research directions are especially notable. The first direction is
exemplified by the efforts of information scientists and geographers
to analyze massive amounts of opportunistically collected individual
78 D. SUNSHINE HILLYGUS & TODD G. SHIELDS, THE PERSUADABLE VOTER: WEDGE
ISSUES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (2009).
79 See Micah Altman, Modeling the Effect of Mandatory District Compactness on
Partisan Gerrymander, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 989, 989 (1998) (analyzing geographic
compactness standards); Jason Barabas & Jennifer Jerit, Redistricting Principles and Racial
Representation, 4 ST. POL. & POL. Q. 415, 415 (2004) (analyzing the effect of traditional
redistricting principles on minority representation in congressional districts); Jonathan Rodden
& Jowei Chen, Using Legislative Districting Simulations to Measure Electoral Bias in
Legislatures 1 (Soc. Pol. Methodology, Working Paper No. 1213, 2010), available at
http://polmeth.wustl.edu/media/Paper/ChenRodden.pdf (“When partisan preferences are
spatially dependent and partisanship is highly correlated with population density, any districting
scheme that generates relatively compact, contiguous districts will tend to produce bias against
the urban party.”).
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data, such as the temporal activity patterns from mobile-phone
location traces, to identify travel patterns, land usage patterns and
neighborhoods.80 Rather than “identifying” neighborhoods using
demographic data, which requires making assumptions about what
demographic characteristics are most relevant to community, this
innovative line of research infers the presence of neighborhoods and
communities from common patterns of activity and/or shared
activities.
The second direction is to enable individuals to identify their own
communities using participative GIS on the web. This is an approach
we have taken in building the DistrictBuilder software.81 The
community mapping functionality, added in the last released version
of DistrictBuilder, is, to our knowledge, entirely unique. An important
aspect of drawing a redistricting plan is identification and
consideration of communities of interest—but this has, until now,
occurred in an ad-hoc way. The software extensions enable users to
draw their own communities, independent of any particular
redistricting plan; and to display and evaluate districting plans using
their own community maps and community maps published by other
users. Potentially, this can allow community boundaries to emerge
organically from user input.
B. Information Technology & Outcome-Based Regulation of
Redistricting
Advances in computing technology and statistical methodology
have enabled relatively robust predictions across a wide range of
types of electoral outcomes likely to result from any proposed
redistricting plan.82 Among the many methodologies in use as
outcome measures, Andrew Gelman’s and Gary King’s bias and
responsiveness predictions have received the most recent scholarly
recognition.83 It is easy, however, to conflate the prediction of
electoral characteristics of plans with the detection of gerrymanders
80 See, e.g., Giusy Di Lorenzo & Francesco Calabrese, Identifying Human SpatioTemporal Activity Patterns from Mobile-Phone Traces 1069–1074 (paper presented at 14th Int’l
IEEE Conf. on Intelligent Transportation Systems, Oct. 5–7, 2011), available at
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6082974 (identifying human activity
through mobile phones); Francesco Calabrese et al., Eigenplaces: Segmenting Space through
Digital Signatures, 9 IEEE PERVASIVE COMPUTING 78 (2010), available at
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/52542 (using eigendecomposition to leverage network activity data
and find correlations to the physical environment).
81 Altman & McDonald , supra note 76.
82 For a non-technical description of how election results can be predicted and indicia
derived from these generally, see Grofman & King, supra note 63, at 10–12.
83 Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral Systems and
Redistricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 513 (1994)
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based on such predictions. The former has become fairly easy,
whereas the latter remains deeply challenged.84
One fundamental statistical limitation of such forecasting methods,
as Gelman and King explain, is that they are predictive, not causal
models, and are inferentially unrelated to gerrymandering. For
example, as we have alluded to previously, a compactness standard
generally favors the Republican Party. If a state has a compactness
criterion in its state constitution, a naive interpretation of estimate
predicting a Republican ‘bias’, may suggest that a Republican
gerrymander occurred when in fact a redistricting authority was
faithfully following legitimate legal constraints. A partisan unbiased
redistricting plan may not exist, or may violate any number of other
criteria.
A second, and fundamental substantive limitation to these methods
is that neither the courts nor social scientists have reached consensus
on what outcome criteria should be applied. 85 As it turns out, it is
provably impossible to create districts that optimize all candidate
outcome criteria simultaneously, thus trade-offs among potential
“good” outcomes are inevitable. And no one redistricting plan is
likely to score highest on all the criteria that may be agreed upon to
be desirable, even assuming a local consensus exists. How one values,
for example, preserving communities versus having competitive
districts is a trade-off that requires human judgment. There is no
common dimension to these criteria, and the courts have been
reluctant to issue guidance on such trade-offs in all but the most
egregious violations.
Information technology does offer some hope. The development of
a new generation of software, such as our DistrictBuilder system,86
has enabled members of the public to create hundreds of real
redistricting plans—plans based on official census data, and satisfying
all of the criteria required by law. The existence of this large corpus
of plans for the first time is beginning to enable an empirical analysis
of redistricting plans that both expands our understanding of the range
of redistricting outcomes that are feasible in practice, and illuminates
the trade-offs that members of the public tend to view as most
desirable.

84 See generally Altman & McDonald, supra note 76, at 77–88 (discussing the use of
computing in evaluating and automating redistricting plans).
85 See Altman & McDonald, supra note 76, at 83–84 (describing this lack of agreement).
86 DISTRICT BUILDER, http://www.districtbuilder.org (last visited May 10, 2012).
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C. Information Technology and Institution-Selecting Regulation of
Redistricting
Technology has fundamentally changed the process of
redistricting. Starting in the 1990s, geographic information systems
were developed to aid those drawing redistricting plans.
Computerized redistricting was an enormous leap forward in
productivity from drawing districts on paper maps.87 Still, these early
computer systems were prohibitively expensive for all but the bestfunded organizations to develop and implement.
By the 2000 round of redistricting, computers had greatly
increased in speed, decreased in cost, and become a ubiquitous part of
redistricting. Simultaneously, the rapid expansion of the Internet and
World Wide Web enabled redistricting authorities to disseminate
information about redistricting widely and cheaply—if they were
inclined to do so. Writing in 2005, we noted:
Advances in technology seemed to offer the potential for
deeper change, in a number of ways that have not been
widely discussed: First, computing technology has the
potential to change how politicians deliberate over proposed
districts, since changes to district maps that would have taken
days to make in the 1980’s and even 1990’s can now be made
in minutes or hours, and because software now allows plans
to be quickly presented and accurately compared. (One
software developer we interviewed even drew particular
attention to the popularity of the feature that allowed two
plans to be compared to determine exactly where they
differed.) Second, computing technology has opened the door
to electronic submissions of maps drawn by the public and by
interest groups, since redistricting software is now both
relatively inexpensive and easy to use. Third, computing
technology enables the use of richer data sources in a shorter
period of time. In the past, because of the time-constraints
under which redistricting takes place, and the difficulty of
managing the computing and data, data-sources reflecting
communities of interest were much more difficult to
incorporate.

87 See Micah Altman, Karin Mac Donald & Michael McDonald, Pushbutton
Gerrymanders?: How Computing Has Changed Redistricting, in PARTY LINES, supra note 42,
at 51–63 (surveying the use of computers in redistricting in the 1990 and 2000 rounds of
redistricting).
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At the same time—there is no evidence that this potential has
been realized to any great extent: Ease of deliberation is
important only when political actors choose to deliberate.
Public submission of plans makes a difference only when
they are likely to be considered by a redistricting authority. A
criterion such as “communities of interest” can only be
applied when the appropriate data is collected and made
available. These are, fundamentally, political issues, and we
have not been able to uncover evidence that computing
technology has, as yet, significantly altered them.88
By the 2010 round of redistricting, redistricting software was low
cost, computing power increased tremendously, and the data were
generally readily available such that:
Mappers were able to specify a desired outcome or
outcomes—the number of people in a district, say, or the
percentage of Democrats in it—and have the program design
a potential new district instantly. These systems allow
redistricters to create hundreds of rough drafts easily and
quickly, and to choose from among them maps that are both
politically and aesthetically appealing.89
Moreover, in contrast to the previous round of redistricting, we are
now seeing indications that technology is leading to an increase in the
transparency of redistricting, and to an increase in public participation
in redistricting.90 First, state legislative authorities are making
proposed redistricting plans available online in the vast majority of
states—a substantial increase relative to ten years ago. Second,
substantially more of the electoral data needed for redistricting is
available in this round of redistricting, due in large part to the efforts
of individual academics and foundations acting in the public interest
to collect, aggregate, clean, and disseminate public-use data. Third,
online redistricting sites have enabled members of the public to create
hundreds of legal plans—an increase of two orders of magnitude.
The desirability of increased transparency and participation is
being recognized at the highest levels of government.91
88 Micah Altman & Michael McDonald, From Crayons to Computers: The Evolution of
Computer Use in Redistricting, 23 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 334, 343 (2005), available at
http://ssc.sagepub.com/content/23/3/334.full.pdf+html.
89 Don Peck & Caitlin Casey, The Nation in Numbers: Packing, Cracking, and
Kidnapping: The Science of Gerrymandering, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 50, 50–
51.
90 Altman & McDonald, supra note 34, at 247–48.
91 See Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685
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Correspondingly, an emerging institutional principle for redistricting
is the availability of data and open software to enable the public
creation and evaluation of redistricting plans.
In essence, open online redistricting is an institution-selecting
mechanism. In its strongest form, open public redistricting online has
the potential to shift the actors directly responsible for redistricting
from a small number of legislators or commissioners to a much larger
public.
In a weaker form, where a smaller group is ultimately responsible
for the selection of a redistricting plan, as will be the case in many
places for the foreseeable future, open public redistricting may
constrain redistricting. Public redistricting creates a corpus of
evidence that is both broader and more detailed than what has been
previously generated through independent commissions, and this
evidence reveals geographical communities, public preferences over
redistricting, and the range of possible redistricting outcomes
achievable. When this evidence is a matter of public record,
commissioners may be more constrained in their action; and the
courts more willing to infer partisan intent where the resulting plan
deviates substantially from public input.
Specific principles for open access to government information are
also becoming widely recognized. In October 2007, thirty opengovernment advocates met in Sebastopol, California to discuss how
government could make data open to the public in a systematic and
principled way. The conference, led by Carl Malamud and Tim
O’Reilly, and funded by a grant from the Sunlight Foundation,
resulted in a list of eight principles, which were later expanded and
updated by the foundation, to form their current “Ten Principles for
Opening Up Government Information”: completeness, primacy,
timeliness, ease of physical and electronic access, machine
readability, nondiscrimination, use of commonly owned standards,
public domain licensing, permanence, and elimination of usage
costs.92

(Jan. 21, 2009) (stating that the Obama administration “is committed to creating an
unprecedented level of openness in government.”); OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, OPEN GOVERNMENT: A PROGRESS REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 1 (2009),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ogi-progress-reportamerican-people.pdf (stating that the Obama administration would usher in “a new era of open
and accountable government meant to bridge the gap between the American people and their
government.”).
92 Ten Principles For Opening up Government Information, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION
(Aug. 11, 2010), http://sunlightfoundation.com/policy/documents/ten-open-data-principles; see
also David G. Robinson et al., Government Data and the Invisible Hand, 11 YALE J. L. & TECH.
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In 2010, with the support of the Sloan foundation, the Brookings
Institution, and the American Enterprise institute, we convened an
advisory board to develop guiding principles for transparency in
redistricting. The advisory board members included key redistricting
experts at Common Cause and the League of Women Voters,
experienced redistricting consultants, and bipartisan representation
from elected officials. Thomas Mann at the Brookings Institution and
Normal Ornstein at the American Enterprise Institute directed the
advisory board. The board issued principles for transparency and
public participation in redistricting. These principles are in the same
spirit as the Sunlight principles and require free electronic access to
the complete information necessary for the public to “verify,
reproduce and evaluate” all proposed redistricting plans. The AEIBrookings principles also recognize that the redistricting process is so
complex that software is a practical necessity—transparency in
redistricting also requires that software be made available to
reproduce and evaluate redistricting plans proposed by the legislature.
And this software should itself be transparent—preferably through
use of open source, or if necessary, through documentation sufficient
for complete independent replication of the results.93
While barriers to public participation and transparency in
redistricting have been lowered, challenges remain, particularly with
respect to how redistricting authorities make available the election,
geographic, and population data necessary to create legal redistricting
plans, and the format in which they release their redistricting plans.94
Nearly all states participate in what is known as Phase 2 of the
Census Bureau’s redistricting data program in which states and
localities transmit their political boundaries, including precincts and
wards, to the Census Bureau, for inclusion in the geography that the
Census Bureau uses in reporting population summaries.95 Electronic
representations of election boundaries described in terms of census
geography enable one to merge together census data and election

160, 170 (2009) (proposing the simple principle that “federal government’s primary objective as
an online publisher is to provide data that is easy for others to reuse.”).
93 Micah Altman, Thomas E. Mann, Michael P. McDonald, & Norman J. Ornstein,
Principles for Transparency and Public Participation in Redistricting, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTE
(June
17,
2010),
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0617_redistricting_statement.aspx.
94 As co-principle investigators of the Public Mapping Project, we constructed merged
census and election data for a number of states and localities to be used with our software. We
describe here some of the challenges that we faced.
95 2010 Census Redistricting Data Program Commencement of Phase 2: The Voting
District/Block Boundary Suggestion Project, 72 Fed. Reg. 19879 (Apr. 20, 2007).
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results, so that the electoral consequences of a redistricting plan can
be predicted.
There are two challenges to the integration of election data with
census data. First, some states—such as Oregon and Rhode Island—
do not transmit election boundaries to the Census Bureau, but rather
they must be collected from election officials and expressed in the
census geography. Some states and localities change their election
boundaries at each election, requiring those who wish to evaluate a
wide range of elections to collect and reconcile these boundaries.
While some states collect, process, and publicly release these data, in
other states consultants to the political parties collect this information
and keep it private. A state that wishes to promote redistricting
transparency and public participation should participate fully in Phase
2 of the Census Bureau data collection effort and make publicly
available changes to election boundaries.
Second, some states do not report complete election data for their
precincts. For example, Georgia and South Carolina report precinctlevel election-results only for persons who voted in-person on
Election Day. Persons who voted early are reported in separate
county-wide precincts. Predictions of election outcomes may be
misleading if persons who voted in-person differ from those who
voted early and there is a substantial number of early voters. Other
states faced with a similar problem chose to report non-precinct
election results by voters’ home precinct,96 which is the best method
of addressing this issue.
A redistricting authority can reduce public participation and
transparency in the redistricting process by limiting access to the
geographic boundaries that are required by law to be used in
redistricting. For example, Ohio did not transmit the correct
boundaries of their precincts, wards, and local governments to the
Census Bureau, which was a rather serious issue since the Ohio
constitution requires state legislative districts to respect local
government and election boundaries.97 The state commissioned a
consultant to digitize the correct boundaries for the state legislative
redistricting. The authors supported an Ohio coalition of redistricting
advocacy groups and found that the multiple releases of the
consultant’s database issued to fix problems (some of which we had
originally identified) caused costly rework and technical challenges,
thereby impeding the advocates’ ability to fully participate in the
96 See, e.g., COL. CODE. REGS. § 1505–1:38.12 (2007) (requiring vote center—essentially
at-large precincts—election results from June 16, 2006 and onward to be reported by voters’
home precincts.)
97 OHIO CONST. art. 11, § 07.
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redistricting process. This situation would not have occurred if Ohio
had worked fully with the Census Bureau to define its geography.
A redistricting authority can reduce public participation and
transparency by limiting access to correct population data. For
example, leading into the 2010 redistricting New York passed a law
that called for the reallocation of prisoners to their residence of origin
for the purposes of state legislative redistricting.98 The state
legislature’s Legislative Task Force, the entity responsible for
constructing these data, delayed nearly a year. The prison-adjusted
population data was released the same week the Legislative Task
Force released their draft redistricting plans, which made it difficult
for advocates to evaluate the plans and to propose their own as
alternatives. This situation illustrates the importance of the timely
release of data.
A redistricting authority can reduce public participation and
transparency by releasing data in forms that are difficult to use.
Redistricting software commonly describes redistricting plans in a
format known as the block equivalency file. In this format each
census block—the lowest level of census geography—is assigned to a
corresponding district. All redistricting authorities, all of which use
commercial redistricting software, are capable of releasing plans in
this common format, but not all do. Some states simply provide
images of proposed plans—which may not even provide enough
detail to distinguish boundaries unambiguously; some provide what
are known as “metes and bounds,” which literally describe the
boundaries of districts in terms of roads, cities, rivers, and other
features; and some report plan components, which is a hierarchical
listing of census geography from counties down that are wholly
contained in each district. All three of these alternative methods of
disseminating plans are not easily imported into redistricting
software, thereby posing a challenge to independent evaluation of
proposed plans. Some states have made advances towards greater
transparency, and we urge more to do so. New York, a state that
traditionally has released plans in metes and bounds, released block
equivalency files this cycle.
CONCLUSION
New technologies hold great promise for increasing transparency
and public participation in the redistricting process. These
technologies are enabling the public to view redistricting plans as
98

N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83–m(13) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 2012).
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they are proposed, evaluate them for compliance with traditional
redistricting principles and political effects, and even propose their
own alternatives:99 These uses of technology highlight an emerging
set of institutional principles to promote public participation and
transparency in redistricting for the twenty-first century: First,
redistricting authorities may disseminate information on the Internet,
such as proposed maps, meeting transcripts, and reports of district.
This reduces barriers to monitoring the redistricting process. Second,
they may make data available describing proposed districts in ways
that enable independent evaluation. This facilitates forecasting of
redistricting outcomes. Third, they may make software available to
enable the public to propose their own plans. This puts pressure on
the institutions of redistricting to be accountable. Finally, with
lowered barriers of entry for those interested in drawing districts,
redistricting authorities may accept plans and comments from the
public. And this would shift the institutions of redistricting toward
greater independence from political forces.

99

For a review, see Altman & McDonald, supra note 76, at 98–101.

